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Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and
the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan
Kerry E. Irish

Abstract
This article takes the view that Dwight D. Eisenhower's work as a
staff officer in the War Department in the early 1930s was significant not only for his own career, but also for the United States. In
these years, Eisenhower wrote the first detailed industrial mobilization plan, the blueprint the nation would follow if it entered a
major war. Though not formally implemented in 1941, much of
Eisenhower's plan provided the basis for a more efficient transition
to war production than had occurred during World War I. Moreover,
his work enhanced his reputation in the Army.

I

N late 1929 Major Dwight D. Eisenhower went to work in the War
Department for Brigadier General George van Hom Moseley, an
adviser to Assistant Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley. Hurley, Moseley-and now Eisenhower-were primarily concerned with developing a
plan for mobilizing American industry to supply the military with the
accoutrements of war in timely fashion, something it had largely failed
to do in the Great War.l Eisenhower would spend two and one-half years
of his life working on the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP) and
related matters.
Unfortunately, Eisenhower scholars have not taken the time to
investigate or understand this era of their subject's life; most have dis1. Paul A. C. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 30, 40.
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missed it as unimportant or given it little attention. 2 It was not unimportant. Eisenhower's work in the early 1930s, especially on the Industrial Mobilization Plan, had a significant impact on his development.
Indeed, it was the basis for his understanding of what he eventually
called the "military-industrial complex." Eisenhower's work in these
years provided him with detailed information and deep experience
regarding industrial production for war and first-hand knowledge of leading Army officers, important businessmen, and government officials.
Indeed, Eisenhower contributed more to the 1930 IMP than any other
Army officer. Additionally, and thus helping to demonstrate the significance of Eisenhower's work in this era, the 1930 Industrial Mobilization
Plan constituted an important element in the military preparedness of
the United States. The 1930 IMP was the basis for all of the industrial
mobilization plans that followed, and the work done on these plans did
indeed aid in industrial production during World War II in spite of the
fact that President Franklin D. Roosevelt did not formally adopt the
Army plan. Finally, it was Eisenhower's work on the Industrial Mobilization Plan that brought him to the attention of Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur.
Some background information is helpful in understanding the significance of this era in Eisenhower's life and for the nation. The legislation
that mandated creation of an industrial mobilization plan was the
National Defense Act of 1920. That act found its genesis in the inadequate American industrial response to the Great War. The lack of prewar
planning for industrial mobilization had led to confusion, bottlenecks,
and delay in supplying American troops, delay that ultimately meant
unnecessary deaths. This shortage of U.S. weapons made training difficult and stretched the resources of America's allies.3 Congress, at least
for a few months after the conclusion of the war in November 1918, was

2. See Piers Brendon, Ike: His Life and Times (New York: Harper and Row,
1986), 58; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, PresidentElect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 88, 92 (Ambrose does allow
that Eisenhower's work did add to his education); Kenneth S. Davis, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier ofDemocracy (New York: Konecky and Konecky, 1945), 229; Geoffrey
Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 106-9; Rick Atkinson, An
Army at Dawn: 'fhe War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2002), 59.
3. Elberton Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilwtion, a volume in United
States Army in World War II (Washington: Center of Military History, United States
Army, 1959), 35; Martin Blumenson, Heroes Ne'Oer Die: Warriors and Waifare in
World War II (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), 212; Terrence J. Gough, "Soldiers, Businessmen and US Industrial Planning Between the World Wars," War and
Society 9 (May 1991): 63.
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determined that such a tragic waste of men and time should not be
repeated. 4
The Assistant Secretary of War was the civilian official given responsibility for developing an IMP. 5 The Army gave the following definition of
such a plan:
Mobilization of industry for military purposes during a national
emergency is the operation of adjusting peace time energy and
industry to meet the essential requirements of national life, and the
maximum requirements of military effort, with a minimum of disturbance of normal conditions. 6

Though Congress had mandated these plans, it is important to note
that the plans the Assistant Secretary's office created, since they
involved the bureaucratic machinery of the federal government, necessarily took the form of a recommendation to the President. 7 The Army
then found itself hampered in the creation of an industrial mobilization
plan by the fact it could never be certain that the President or Congress
would adopt the plan at the appropriate moment.8
Throughout the 1920s the Army devoted most of its efforts to supplying its forces as opposed to planning for industrial mobilization during war. This apathy toward planning, and the determination of both
Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge to cut the military
budget, aroused the ire of Bernard Baruch, who had headed the War
Industries Board (WIB) during the Great War. That body had guided the
wartime industrial production of the nation. 9 Once the war ended, the
WIB passed away. Baruch was determined to create some civilian-led
permanent body, along the lines of the WIB, that would prepare and
organize American industrial production for rapid and efficient conversion to wartime needs. 10 To this fight, which he waged throughout the
twenties and thirties, Baruch brought the prestige of his war service and
the fact that he was a highly successful and respected financier and stock
4. Albert Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," in American Ci'Vil-Military
Decisions, ed. Harold Stein (University: University of Alabama Press, 1962), 63;
Harold W. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 1920-1940 (Washington:
Historical Section, General Administrative Services Division, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1943), 4, 5.
5. Robert Miller, "The United States Army During the 1930s" (Ph.D. diss.,
Princeton University, 1973), 40, 41; John Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed
Forces: A Study of Presidential Attitudes and Policy" (Ph.D. diss. , Northwestern University, 1971), 92.
6. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 57.
7. Ibid., 13, 14.
8. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 73.
9. Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex, 33.
10. Ibid., 51.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

speculator. Indeed, in 1929, Baruch advised many of his friends, including Will Rogers and General John J. Pershing, to get out of the stock market before the great crash. 11 It was Baruch's pressure on the War
Department that had led to the creation of the Army Industrial College
in 1924, but this hardly satisfied Baruch. 12 He even used his own money
to pay for the expert advice of sociologists, political scientists, economists, and statisticians in formulating his industrial mobilization plan. 13
As the 1920s passed, the Army bandied about ideas for a superagency such as the Great War's War Industries Board; still, there was no
detailed IMP. 14 Indeed, many Army officers resented what they regarded
as civilian interference in Army matters and did not want the War
Department to develop an IMP that featured civilian control of Army procurement. Even General Charles P. Summerall (Army Chief of Staff from
1926 to 1930) opposed such work. 15 Undaunted, Baruch and other concerned citizens, including Brigadier General Hugh S. Johnson and other
Baruch associates from the WIB, kept pressure on political leaders and
the War Department to formulate a detailed IMP, one that featured a
civilian-dominated government agency to coordinate war production. 16
But Baruch and his allies beat their heads against a deaf and dumb body
politic. The Coolidge administration (1923-29) and an increasingly isolationist populace were determined to cut defense spending and deemphasize the military. 17 Army officers in the Planning Branch, forced
by lack of resources to focus on immediate procurement needs, found little time in the mid-twenties to add to their admittedly sketchy IMP. 18
However, by 1928 the Army had managed to produce its most detailed,
though still rudimentary, IMP. Referred to as the Basic Procurement
11. Maury Klein, Rainbows End: The Crash of 1929 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 193; Jordan A. Schwarz, The Speculator: Bernard M. Baruch in Washington, 1917-1965 (Chapel HiU: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 169.
12. Schwarz, The Speculator, 3-8, 336.
13. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization
in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1955),
512.
14. Ibid., 504; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 68, 79, 80, 81;
Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 65; Schwarz, The Speculator, 335.
15. George van Horn Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey, vol. II," unpublished
memoir, George Van Horn Moseley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.; 116; Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 77.
16. Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 65; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 512; Koistinen, The Military-Industrial Complex, 51.
17. Schwarz, The Speculator, 335; Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 73, 74.
18. War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President (Washington: GPO, 1931), 25; Thatcher, Plannin~for Industrial Mobilization, 82; Kreidberg
and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 504-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Plan, it featured civilian-dominated "war service committees," which
were to act as liaisons between industry and the War Department; it also
raised the possibility of coercion of labor during war. 19
Ironically, movement toward a more highly developed IMP gathered
force when Herbert C. Hoover, one of the most peace-oriented presidents
in American history, became chief executive in 1929. Hoover, though a
determined advocate for peace, was not a total pacifist; he was a gifted
organizer, a thorough leader, and a realist. Assistant Secretary of War
Patrick Hurley-with the guidance and energy of Moseley-produced the
next step in the IMP in 1929.20 Known as the "Hurley Plan," the 1929
IMP featured an example of Moseley's creativity: a new cabinet-level
position to be activated when the President declared a war emergency.
That day was known as M-Day, defined by the War Department as the
first day of mobilization, and would most likely be synonymous with a
declaration of war, but not automatically so. 21 This new secretary would
"act for President on all nat. def. matters," which actually included all
areas in procurement and industrial mobilization since other areas of
national defense came under the Secretary of War. 22
The Hurley Plan was intended to be the catalyst for discussion of
how best to proceed. It certainly served that purpose. The proposed new
cabinet position was almost universally condemned. Bernard Baruch
criticized the idea as disruptive to war production: the new secretary
would replace existing authority at just the moment when established
relationships and procedures were most needed to facilitate war production.23 Interestingly, Moseley's more ambitious ideas were not represented in the IMP; privately, he advocated the creation of a Department
of Defense, which would unify all the services and their needs under one
office. Moseley, in this regard, was ahead of his time. 24 Prophetically,
some critics worried that if the War Department plans were too comprehensive, or centralized too much authority in one man or group of men,

19. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 71, 72, 78, 79; Kreidberg
and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 504, 505.
20. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 84, 85. See also Thatcher's
footnotes numbered 68 and 69, crediting Hurley; Blum, "Birth and Death of theMDay Plan," 65; Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 140.
21. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 58, 85.
22. Chief of Staff Diary, 12 November 1930, in Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries
and Selected Papers, 1905-1941, ed. Daniel Holt and James Leyerzapf (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 145; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial
Mobilization, 85; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 507.
23. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 508.
24. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 508.
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they might be ignored by a president zealous for his own authority, or
distrustful of businessmen or the military. 25
The Hurley IMP was to be revised every other year so as to remain
current and viable relative to the Army's probable role in any national
emergency. 26 Unfortunately, the Army's mission was no more clearly
defined in 1930 than it had been in 1920; indeed, one could add 1940 as
well. For example, many fundamental questions had no definitive
answers: What were United States security interests? Would the country
fight for the Philippines? Who were its most likely enemies in war: Great
Britain, Mexico, Germany, or Japan? And what kind of war would be
waged against that enemy; would the Army fight for the Philippines or
would that war be a Navy show? With little guidance from the President
or the State Department, the Army adopted the wisest and most cautious
approach: prepare for the biggest war imaginable-in other words, a
repeat of the Great War. 27
Dwight Eisenhower came to the War Department convinced that
thorough planning for a future war was an absolute must in the modern
world. Eisenhower had attended the Army War College in 1927-28.
While there he had co-written a major research paper entitled "War and
its Principles, Methods, and Doctrines" and was the sole author of
another important work entitled "An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular
Army." Both works emphasize the point that in future wars, fortune
would favor those nations that had engaged in extensive preparation in
both manpower and industrial capacity. In "War and its Principles,"
Eisenhower wrote:
It will be shown that though the actual conflict (battle) is waged
between armed forces which have been prepared for battle, the
preparation and maintenance of those forces requires the utmost in
industrial organization, and free access to sources of raw materials. 28

Eisenhower went on to assert his belief that preparation, or lack of it,
may decide the conflict:
Modem war is fought between armed forces composed of men and
materials which have been specially prepared for battle. Lacking

25. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 89.
26. War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1931, 26.
27. Miller, "The United States Army in the 1930s," 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75;
Mark A . Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance,
and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000), 2, 3, 6.
28. Dwight Eisenhower et al., Army War College Paper: "War and its Principles,
Methods, and Doctrines," File: Army, A-Army, Z (misc.), Box 2, Name Series, Principal Files, Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916-52 (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Dwight
D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter EL), Abilene, Kansas.
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such preparation, men and materials on the battlefield are useless,
and preparation consumes an appreciable period of time. [Emphasis
in the original)29

Eisenhower, in opposition to conventional wisdom, believed that the
next war would likely feature an enemy with a highly mobile and massive offensive capability; there would be little time to organize a response
to such a foe. 30 Making matters worse and prewar planning even more
important, the United States had little in the way of a permanent "munitions industry." Most of the corporations that would supply the American soldier would have to convert to war production. 31 Finally, he
believed that given the American democratic system, an agency that
would coordinate the nation's military response had to be both powerful
and led by civilians. 32 Eisenhower, then, was not just passing time in
these years, but was attempting to put in place a program he believed
was the cornerstone of national defense.
In working for Moseley, Eisenhower was reunited with fellow West
Pointer Wade H. Haislip (U.S. Military Academy, 1912) and best friend
Leonard T. Gerow, with whom he had studied at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1925-26. Eisenhower had graduated first in his class, Gerow eleventh. They were a great team. 33
Eisenhower also had the opportunity to renew a friendship with another
old comrade, George S. Patton, who had been assigned to the office of
the Chief of Cavalry in 1928.34
George Moseley was an interesting combination of prejudices, opinions, charm, and talent. In the Great War, Moseley had, by all accounts,
done a masterful job as G-4 of the American Expeditionary Forces
(AEF), the officer in charge of supply. Indeed, it seems his reputation
was as lofty as that of Pershing's G-3 (operations), Fox Conner.. That

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.; Dwight Eisenhower, "An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army," Memorandum for the Assistant Commandant, Army War College, 15 March 1928, in Holt
and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 62-78; Benjamin F. Cooling, "Dwight D. Eisenhower at the Army War College, 1927-1928," Parameters 5 (1975): 26, 27; Dwight Eisenhower, "War Policies," Cavalry Journal,
November 1931, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and
Selected Papers, 199.
31. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 60.
32. Schwarz, The Speculator, 337.
33. Chief of Staff Diary, 9 November 1929, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower:
The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 111; Perret, Eisenhower, 95, 106. A memo
in Eisenhower's 201 File lists the class standing. Some sources have Gerow finishing
number two, but this is inaccurate.
34. Carlo D'Este, Patton: A Genius For War (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 341, 346.
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Eisenhower would spend years working for both men was indeed fortunate in terms of both his education and his career.
Eisenhower saw Moseley as a "brilliant officer" who inspired and
encouraged creativity in his subordinates.35 He appreciated Moseley's
organizational genius. 36 As noted above, Moseley often solved problems
in unconventional ways; he was not a stickler for Army regulations. He
prized common sense above traditional methods. 37 This appealed to
Eisenhower, who usually loved both minor rebellions and creative thinking: his career at West Point comes to mind, as do his tank doctrines and
fondness for new methods of waging war. To have a superior officer actually encourage original thought was irresistibly refreshing. Moseley gave
his aides important work to do and relied heavily upon that work. 38
There were, of course, limits to creative freedom. The Army was not a
democracy. Once Moseley had made a decision, it had to be fully and
professionally executed. Eisenhower understood and appreciated the
fact that Moseley expected his officers to advance the ideas and programs of the commanding officer.39
Some authors have argued that Eisenhower was unusually reluctant
to share his opinions with superior officers, and that he was overly subject to the opinions of stronger men. 40 Eisenhower's willingness to learn
from others has been misunderstood as mental weakness. He had a great
talent for assessing character, for gauging what he could say and how he
could say it to any given person. He and Fox Conner, during their time
together in the Panama Canal Zone in the early 1920s, had argued at
length and loudly over military tactics. With Moseley, Eisenhower
enjoyed political discussions. Moseley was fully aware that the younger
man was not nearly as conservative as he was. In September 1943 he
wrote Eisenhower a letter that discussed the presidential election in
1944:
In his broadcast last Sunday night, Walter Winchell stated that if the
Republicans ran [Douglas J MacArthur as President, Mr. Roosevelt
35. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The
Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 225-27; Dwight Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I
Thll to Friends (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967), 210; Matthew
Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 160.
36. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 108; Dwight Eisenhower to George
Van Horn Moseley, 11 June 1943, File: Moseley, George Van Horn, Box 84, Principal
File, Pre-Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Papers, EL.
37. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 109.
38. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 119.
39. Dwight Eisenhower to George Van Horn Moseley, 23 November 1934, Moseley File, EL.
40. Brendon, Ike, 10, 13, 58, 59, 109, 110; Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Anny, President-Elect, 72, 73.
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would take you on as his running mate. I have no respect whatsoever
for Mr. Winchell, but sometimes he gets the news quite accurate. 41

Moseley clearly had reason to believe that Eisenhower would be acceptable to Roosevelt; certainly the idea did not surprise him. Eisenhower
had appreciated much about the Democrats when he was a young man;
he also admired some aspects of FDR's New Deal. One can easily imagine that he and Moseley had interesting discussions in the early 1930s. 42
In late 1929, Eisenhower and Major Gilbert Wilkes, an engineer also
assigned to work on the IMP, began "intriguing and frustrating" work on
that plan. 43 In response to the criticism of Baruch and others, Moseley
ordered adjustments to the IMP. 44 For example, Baruch had suggested
that Moseley's proposed separate department of munitions be eliminated. Moseley acquiesced; the munitions department was integrated
into the IMP. 45 He did not, however, give up his idea of a new cabinetlevel position. 46 In addition to these adjustments, Eisenhower and Wilkes
visited various manufacturers and asked to see their old plans for conversion to war production. The two officers requested suggestions as to
how such plans might be improved. But few businessmen, or politicians
for that matter, were interested in talking about conversion plans. Rather
than anticipating fat contracts for war production, most industrialists
were concerned that cooperation with the Army might force them to
reveal trade secrets, or, should war come, result in loss of control of their
own businesses. Furthermore, most Americans believed there would not
be another major warY
In December 1929, Hoover had promoted the energetic Hurley to
the post of Secretary of War; he was the first such secretary to have carried a rifle in the Army as a private. As secretary, Hurley had even
greater authority to see the IMP revised and implemented; the extremely
41. George Van Horn Moseley to Dwight Eisenhower, 29 September 1943, Moseley File, EL.
42. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1933, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The
Prewar Diaries, 229, 251, 252 (the entry on page 229 concerning Hugh Johnson is
dated June 1932; however, the context of Ike's comments makes clear that the date
must be later, perhaps 1933, since Ike remarks that Hugh Johnson is head of the
National Recovery Administration); Chief of Staff Diary, 20 April and 2 June 1933, in
Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 251, 252.
43. Eisenhower, At Ease, 210.
44. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 90.
45. Ibid., 90, 91.
46. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 508; Chief of Staff
Diary, 12 November 1930, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries
and Selected Papers, 145.
47. Eisenhower, At Ease, 210, 211; Miller, "The United States Army in the
1930s," 78, 79; Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1987), 250.
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competent Moseley carried on his duties without the aid of an assistant
secretary of war until April 1930 when the President gave Frederick H.
Payne the job. 48
Payne loved the Army, and Eisenhower soon gained his confidence.49
In June 1930 the major wrote an article for the Assistant Secretary. Published under the latter's name in Army Ordnance, the article outlined
Payne's and Eisenhower's basic IMP ideas. Many Army officers, like Chief
of Staff Summerall, opposed any further civilian "meddling" in the Army.
Others were suspicious of, if not hostile to, such activity and prone to
credit exaggerations. The article was an attempt to ease fears and
explain the reality of modem war. Eisenhower emphasized four areas of
concern. First, he calmed nerves and dispelled rumors: there would be
no nationalization of industry under the plan, and chief executive officers would not become colonels, ordered about like lackeys. Nor would
every aspect of production be regimented. Indeed, the planners hoped to
avoid unnecessary disruption of the domestic economy and culture. 50
Second, Eisenhower explained that modem war was a conflict
between economies; production of the weapons and supplies of war was
as important as sound strategy and tactics. 51 He no doubt recalled his
Great War efforts to train tank crews with no tanks at Camp Colt, Pennsylvania (on the old Gettysburg battlefield).
Third, an organization that coordinated planning and production
was an absolute must if waste and delay were to be avoided. Only government was large and powerful enough to serve that function. Therefore, Eisenhower, drawing in part on Baruch's ideas, envisioned an
agency that would exercise that control.52 He described it as follows:
Consequently, in the event of war, a great industrial organization will
certainly be a part of the Federal government during the period of
the emergency. This organization must be made up of leaders in all
the branches of industry. Representatives of labor, of manufacturers,
of financiers, of the professions, of agriculturalists, of producers of
raw materials and so on must combine in an organization under the
48. Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 97-98; Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 122.
49. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 128.
SO. Frederick H. Payne, "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization," an article
prepared by Major Eisenhower for Payne, published in Army Ordnance; hereafter
Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization." A copy of the article
with the notation that Eisenhower had written it is in File 875, Box 84, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, Record Group (RG) 107, National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland. The article can also be
found in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers,
138-42.
51. Ibid.
52. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
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President to guide our industrial effort along those lines that will

insure speedy victory-and justice to every citizen. [Emphasis
added )53

Eisenhower's industrial mobilization planning agency was to be more of
a forum for ascertaining the most effective policies as opposed to a vehicle for declaring government directives. The IMP agency Eisenhower
envisioned emphasized cooperation, teamwork, and unity. Only as a last
resort would it issue orders. 54
Finally, Eisenhower warned his readers that such a mobilization of
industry would need to be done quickly; a modern enemy would not
likely allow its opponent time to mobilize and organize its industry as
had usually been the case in the past. The failure to carefully prepare, to
be ready, could mean defeat. 55
As we shall see, some of the details of the IMP would change, but the
basic ideas that underlay it would not. Above all, Eisenhower envisioned
cooperation between government, industry, labor, and the military.
Indeed, for Eisenhower the entire nation would constitute one great
team with its collective face set resolutely toward victory. 56 This philosophy of teamwork, cooperation, and compromise would manifest itself
throughout Eisenhower's Army career and into the presidency.57 Moseley was impressed with Eisenhower's article and with his abilities. Moseley later wrote of him: "He has a remarkable mind and an equally
talented pen, enabling him to present a subject simply and clearly."58
One of the primary obstacles to Hurley's work was, as mentioned,
Chief of Staff Summerall. Fortunately for the Secretary, Summerall's
term as chief ended in late 1930. Hoover's dilemma was whom to appoint
53. Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization," 138-42.
54. Dwight Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization," 2 October 1931 (a paper Eisenhower wrote while a student at the
Industrial War College), in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and
Selected Papers, 187, 188. Eisenhower's conception of the IMP was similar to his
vision for the American Assembly, a think tank that he created while President of
Columbia University from 1948 to 1952. The American Assembly was a forum for
bringing together business leaders, academic experts, and other interested persons of
talent or stature to analyze the nation's major problems and propose solutions.
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 482. For a full
description of the American Assembly, see Travis Jacobs, Eisenhower at Columbia
(Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001).
55. Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization."
56. Ibid.; Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial
Mobilization," 184, 187, 188.
57. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 271,
272; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984), 622-24.
58. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 118.
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as his successor. There were numerous superb candidates. Fox Conner
was General Pershing's personal choice, but Pershing was in France
attending to Battle Monuments Commission business and was thus
unable to personally press Conner's case. William D. Connor, the highly
respected leader of the Army War College, was another possibility, as was
George Moseley. But the man who had Hoover's respect, the man whom
the country knew best because of his combat record in the Great War,
and who had brought long-needed reforms to West Point, was Major General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover chose MacArthur. 59
It is interesting to note that Dwight Eisenhower was well known and
highly respected by three of the leading candidates for chief of staff in
1930. These men had served on Pershing's staff in the Great War: Conner was G-3 (operations), and Connor was G-4 (supply), succeeded by
Moseley. 60 MacArthur later wrote that Eisenhower had established a wellearned reputation for being an "outstanding soldier."61 When Eisenhower
became famous in 1942, the media wondered where he had come from;
many asked if his rise to fame and power was accidental or due just to
luck. But the fact is that Eisenhower was well known, his talents held in
the highest regard by many of those who led the Army. There was less
luck than talent involved in his rise to high command. Addressing this
persistent and pernicious myth, Bernard Baruch has written: "Eisenhower's spectacular rise was no accident. General [George C.] Marshall
chose him, over many of his seniors, to lead the Allied forces because he
recognized his many talents and abilities." 62 Baruch, intimately
acquainted with the Army and its officer corps, and a friend of George
Marshall since a 1922 hunting trip, was in a position to know. 63
It is not too much to say that Eisenhower's service with MacArthur
would, over the years, change his life. In the fall of 1930 the new Chief
of Staff took an avid interest in the work of the Assistant Secretary of
War and his aides. Hurley met with MacArthur, Moseley, and Eisenhower
to discuss the details of the IMP. The men found they agreed on most of

59. Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces," 106-10; D. Clayton James,
The Years of MacArthur, vol. 1, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1970), 343,344. I am aware of the controversy over who opposed and who supported
MacArthur's candidacy; James and Wilson agree that Hoover ultimately made his own
decision.
60. Gary Mead, The Doughboys: America and the First World War (New York:
Overlook Press, 2000), 108.
61. Douglas MacArthur to Dwight Eisenhower, 30 September 1935, Misc. File,
Box 24, Dwight Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-1952, EL.
62. Bernard Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1960), 404.
63. Schwarz, The Speculator, 337.
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the important aspects of the plan. Morale in the Army in general, and the
Planning Branch in particular, rose dramatically. 64
Those who were primarily responsible for the creation of a comprehensive industrial mobilization plan in the early 1930s were Secretary of
War Hurley, his assistant Frederick Payne, Douglas MacArthur, George
van Hom Moseley, Bernard Baruch, and Dwight Eisenhower. But it was
Eisenhower who did much of the research, visited factories , talked to
industrial leaders, took into account his superior's opinions, conceptualized what the plan should include, wrote most of it, and did much of the
arguing for the IMP with both civilians and his Army superiors. The IMP
thus contained many of his ideas regarding war and how it should be
waged. 65 Though Eisenhower was the lowest in rank of the men cited
above, he was unusually persuasive with both oral and written arguments.
Eisenhower drew heavily on the wisdom of the past in the form of
Bernard Baruch and, as we have seen, his own studies at the Army War
College. He had probably come to his conclusions regarding the necessity of industrial planning and preparation independently of Baruch, but
Baruch unquestionably imparted to Eisenhower much of the form that
such planning and preparation should take. Eisenhower was far closer to
Baruch in his ideas than most War Department officers.66 Though Baruch
was a Democrat who advocated virtual government control of crucial
industries in the event of war, Eisenhower respected his views, adopted
many of them, and developed a friendship with the stock speculator that
lasted until his death. Indeed, Eisenhower, more than any other Army
officer, agreed with Baruch's views, attempted to persuade his Army colleagues that most of Baruch's ideas were superior to their own, and
incorporated as many of them as he could into the 1930 IMP. 67 It is then
no surprise that Baruch thought much more highly of the 1930 IMP than
the 1929 version.68 Indeed, historian and Baruch biographer John

64. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 133.
65. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Chief of the Planning Branch, 7 November 1930, File 44, Box 6, Memoranda to Planning Branch, 1931-1932, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, RG 107, NARA; The 1930 Industrial Mobilization
Plan, File 110, Box 12, Records of the Planning Branch, Procurement Division, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of War, 1921-1941, RG 107, NARA; Schwarz, The Speculator, 337. Schwarz credits MacArthur, Baruch, and Eisenhower, but it seems to me
that the other three were also important factors. Holland, Eisenhower Between the
Wars, 161.
66. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211; Schwarz, The Speculator, 337. Eisenhower did
not meet Baruch until 1930, well after he wrote his Army War College paper. Of
course, Baruch's ideas were well publicized before that time.
6 7. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
68. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 91.
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Schwarz has called Eisenhower Baruch's "most apt pupil in the military. "69 Eisenhower wrote in At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends:
High officials believed that a war should be conducted through the
normal, peacetime agencies of government. They did not favor price
controls. They saw no reason for special organization. Those of us
who believed in Baruch's policies argued that competition between
departments of government would interfere with maximum industrial production. They would answer that co-operation between the
Army and Navy would be enough to take care of the problem.

Eisenhower was too much the historian and realist to fall for that reasoning:
All our experience has shown that this was convenient reasoning and
foolishness. Even during war against a common enemy, armies and
navies of the same nation have often delighted in warring against
each other for guns, men-and applause.70

Eisenhower was the primary author of the 1930 IMP, which thus
benefited from many of his talents. 71 Two seem especially important. 72
First was his amazing memory. His wife, Mamie, later recalled that he
"knew by heart production man-hours on everything from a bomber to
a mess kit." 73 Another of Eisenhower's great qualities was his basic
humility; he was usually willing to listen to the ideas of others, including
civilians, to profit from their experience. Some writers have interpreted
this trait negatively: Eisenhower was easily dominated by more forceful
men and their ideas. 74 This generalization might be valid if Eisenhower
had adopted the ideas of such men wholesale, but such was not the case.
He was eclectic, picking and choosing among the ideas he thought best
and then adding his own. Consequently, Eisenhower's work was almost
always reflective of a greater store of knowledge than his own experiences would suggest. 75 His work on the IMP exhibits this most positive of
traits.
Eisenhower adopted some, but not all, of Baruch's philosophy.
Baruch believed that in modem war there was little room for free enter69. Schwarz, The Speculator, 391.
70. Eisenhower, At Ease, 211, 212; Schwarz, The Speculator, 338.
71. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930; Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
72. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930.
73. Dorothy Brandon, Mamie Doud Eisenhower: A Portrait of a First Lady (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), 171.
74. For Eisenhower as easily swayed, dominated, or indecisive, see Brendon,
Ike, 59, 110, 114, 133, 138, 155, 156, 160, 163, 168, 175; D'Este, Patton, 48<r89;
Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002),
423, 424,596,602.
75. Steve Neal, The Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1978), 74.
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prise: the government must control all aspects of the economy; both capital and labor must be subservient to the nation's security interest. He
argued that prices of all goods be capped so as to both secure the economy against inflation and provide as much military power for the dollar
as possible. In addition, labor should be organized to facilitate optimum
production. Baruch, as the head of the War Industries Board in 1918,
was associated in the popular mind with highly coercive policies toward
both industry and labor. 76 In 1930 he was careful to disavow any suggestion that he favored "conscription of labor," but this disavowal was a bit
disingenuous. Baruch believed labor should be cajoled, coerced, and
controlled as necessary: a central government agency would orchestrate
the allocation of labor. 77 He supported what was known as a "work or
fight" bill. 78 Indeed, Baruch believed that in the event of a major war all
aspects of the economy, not just war production, had to come under government control in order to protect the living standards of the populace.
This, in turn, would allow for the maintenance of morale. In order to
achieve the foregoing, Baruch advocated the creation of a permanent
superagency along the lines of the old War Industries Board. 79 In short,
Baruch would end economic freedom during war in order to preserve it
for peace. Finally, his plan would enhance the role of civilian businessmen and industrialists in determining what was needed and who would
·
produce it. 80
Eisenhower's Army plan featured less centralized control than
Baruch's plan, but far more than the old system. 81 Several sources indicate the leading ideas regarding the Army's industrial mobilization plan
as advocated by Dwight Eisenhower: the speech he wrote for Payne to
deliver to the Army War College, the article he wrote for Payne published
in Army Ordnance, the 1930 IMP itself, his paper for the Army Industrial College (where he was a student in 1931), and his article for the
Cavalry Journal of November 1931. The three former sources, of
course, reflect more than Eisenhower's own ideas, but it would be a
76. Morris V. Rosenbloom, Peace Through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a
Blueprint For Security (Washington: American Surveys, 1953), 149.
77. Baruch, The Public Years, 321-28.
78. Ibid., 326.
79. Statement of Bernard Baruch to the War Policies Commission, 6 March
1931, File 152, Box 181, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, War Policies
Commission, 1930-1932, RG 107, NARA; Schwarz, The Speculator, 332-37; New
York Times, 7 March 1931; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization,
512-15; David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 130, 131, 134.
· 80. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 515.
81. Schwarz, The Speculator, 337, 338; Chief of Staff Diary, 12 November
1930-11 December 1930, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries
and Selected Papers, 145.
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mistake to severely discount the degree to which Eisenhower's ideas are
represented in the work he did for Payne and in the industrial mobilization plan. He was no mere typist; he was asked to write these documents
because of the respect he had gained from Payne, Moseley, and others.
Moreover, Moseley highly valued creativity and initiative, and Eisenhower
knew it. 82 These documents, then, do not conceal Eisenhower as much as
they reveal him. Of course, in the Industrial College paper and the journal article, he was relatively free to write whatever he chose in terms of
philosophy. At the end of the day, these sources differ little in regard to
basic ideas; they also reflect and advance ideas that Eisenhower had written about in his work at the Army War College in 1927-28.83
Eisenhower believed that modern war against a great power required
an immediate and massive response. Such a war was essentially two-fold:
it involved a traditional battlefield transformed by modern weapons and
the industrial capabilities of an entire people. These capabilities had to
be organized ahead of the actual conflict. 84 In 1953, President Eisenhower, remembering the American propensity to dismantle its defensive
capability, asserted "that we would not again become so weak militarily
as to encourage aggression."85 But who should organize industry to meet
such a sudden challenge? In the 1930s, Eisenhower was sure that only
high-ranking civilian authorities in government could perform that function. Here he was in opposition to many officers in the War Department
who believed that the Army could coordinate with individual businesses
to supply itself. 86 Eisenhower's plan thus featured not only government
control of war production, but also the creation of a special wartime
body, led by civilians, that would exercise that control along the lines of
the War Industries Board of the Great War era. 87 Both Baruch and
82. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The
Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 225-27; Eisenhower, At Ease, 210; Holland,
Eisenhower Between the Wars, 160.
83. Eisenhower et al., Army War College Paper: "War and its Principles, Methods, and Doctrines."
84. Address by the Honorable F. H. Payne (written by Eisenhower), 6 January
1931, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers,
148; Eisenhower, "War Policies," 199; Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of Industrial Mobilization"; New York Times, 14 May 1931.
85. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday and Company,
1965), 615; Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change (New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1963), 132, 133; Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, 87, 88. Eisenhower
believed the Korean War would not have occurred had Truman not withdrawn substantial forces from Korea in 1948.
86. Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial
Mobilization," 176--88; New York Times, 14 May 1931; Smith, The Army and Ecorwmic Mobiliwtion, 77.
87. Address by Payne (Eisenhower), 6 January 1931, 149, 151, 152, 153; Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization ," 184;
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MacArthur favored this approach.88 The difference between the Army's
plan and the Baruch view was that in the former plan this coordinating
agency would not come into existence until the President, facing either
the threat or the reality of war, so decreed. 89 That decree would constitute the so-called M-Day. Baruch insisted that the controlling agency be
created as soon as possible and perform its duties permanently.90
The 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured four separate "superagencies," one each for war industries, war labor, selective service, and
public relations. The war industries agency was to be dominant, but all
four were to be represented, along with the Army and Navy, on the Advisory Council to the President. An official Army historian remarks,
"Broad decisions of wartime policy would be made by the President and
his council, to be executed by the council members through their
respective organizations. "91
There was still more disagreement between Eisenhower and Baruch
over the role of civilians. The latter envisioned not only a civilian-led
superagency, but also greater prewar civilian leadership in determining
who would produce what items. Many Army officers were afraid that
Baruch's plan deprived the Army of essential decision-making powers. It
also demonstrated greater concern for civilian wartime living standards
than the Army version. 92 Eisenhower, as one would expect, was in favor
of cooperation and compromise.
Another goal of the IMP was to "equalize the burdens of war," specifically to reduce the profits that industrialists had made during the last
war. The most radical of ideas, to nationalize industry, was opposed by
Eisenhower, "War Policies," 194, 195, 199; Payne (Eisenhower), "Fundamentals of
Industrial Mobilization"; Dwight Eisenhower memorandum for Colonel John P. Hasson, 18 November 1930, File 44, Box 6, Memoranda to Planning Branch, 1921-1932,
Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, RG 107, NARA; Industrial Mobilization
Plan, 1930, p. 170; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 150, 151, 154,
161, 163.
88. Statement of General Douglas MacArthur to the War Policies Commission,
1931, File 176, Box 182, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, War Policies
Commission, 1930-1932, RG 107, NARA; Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan,"
66; James, The Years of MacArthur, 1: 462, 463; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial
Mobilization, 150, 151, 154.
89. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, p. 170; Eisenhower, "Brief History of
Planning For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization," 184; Eisenhower, "War Policies," 199.
90. Address by Payne (Eisenhower), 6 January 1931, 149, 153; Eisenhower,
"Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization," 184; Eisenhower, "War Policies," 199; Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 67; Schwarz,
The Speculator, 332-38; New York Times, 14 May 1931.
91. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 78, 79.
92. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, SIS.
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Baruch, who preferred to cap all prices for the duration of the emergency.93 Indeed, Baruch would cap not only the prices of goods associated with war production, but virtually all prices. 94 Eisenhower agreed
with Baruch, but most Army officials were opposed to "radical changes
in normal economic relationships between individuals and between individuals and Government." They did, however, reluctantly admit that
something had to be done to control profits. 95 They advocated capping
profits at 6 percent. 96 At the outbreak of hostilities a "systematic registration of wealth" would take place and "tax legislation framed to place
an equitable burden thereon" created.97
Eisenhower's and Baruch's argument that some form of "price stabilization" was necessary led Army leaders to envision doing away with
cost-plus contracts awarded to the lowest bidder. 98 They preferred prewar agreements between the Army and manufacturers that stipulated
these manufacturers would produce a given product at a given price. The
advantage to this system was that the Army could plan who was to produce what, and negotiate prices in a stable economic environment. The
Army planners believed that this method, along with some modest price
controls, would also help control inflation.
Eisenhower was the Army's strongest advocate of Baruch-like price
controls and continued to argue for them even after the 1930 Industrial
Mobilization Plan was completed. The price control features of the 1930
IMP were merely a first step for Baruch and his pupil; there were those
in and out of the Army who wanted no controls whatsoever, or thought
Baruch's ideas too rigid. 99 Moseley was among the latter. Eisenhower
apparently urged Moseley and Baruch to continue to discuss the issue.100
In his Industrial College paper of October 1931, Eisenhower referenced
93. Statement of Bernard Baruch to the War Policies Commission, 6 March 1931.
94. Ibid.; Carter Field, Bernard Baruch: Park Bench Statesman (New York:
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1944), 231, 232.
95. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, pp. 25, 26.
96. Moseley, "One Soldier's Journey," 135; Statement of General George van
Hom Moseley, Deputy Chief of Staff to the War Policies Commission, File 177, Box
182, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, War Policies Commission , 19301932, RG 107, NARA.
97. New York Times, 14 May 1931; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 150, 152, 153.
98. Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1930, pp. 25-29, 75. Moseley in a letter to
Baruch of 22 May 1931 is clearly entertaining the idea of freezing prices. The letter
can be found in File 79, Box 178, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch, War
Policies Commission, 1930-1932, RG 107, NARA; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial
Mobilization, 158, 159.
99. Eisenhower, "War Policies," 196-200; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 511-16; New York Times, 14 May 1931.
100. Eisenhower, "War Policies," 196, 197; Eisenhower, At Ease, 211.
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a letter from Moseley to Baruch the previous May in which Moseley
describes his now more complete understanding of Baruch's ideas and
expresses some acquiescence in them. 101 In his article for the Ca'Valry
Journal, Eisenhower provided a staunch defense of Baruch's price-capping program that indicates the author personally preferred that method
over the taxing of profits the Army plan envisioned. One of the Baruch
plan's strengths was its greater control of inflation not only in war production but also in the domestic economy as a whole. The Army plan,
with its ambiguous price "stabilization" concept, risked far greater inflationary pressures as profits grew if costs escalated.102 By the time Douglas MacArthur testified before the War Policies Commission in the
spring of 1931, the Army's price stabilization program, though not as
sweeping as Baruch's concept, was far more developed and specific. As
the Army's foremost proponent of price controls and the author of
MacArthur's statement to the War Policies Commission, Eisenhower had
much to do with this move toward price controls. 103 Eisenhower left the
Planning Branch in 1932, but he and Baruch continued to advocate a
"total [price) stabilization plan" throughout the 1930s.l04
Eventually many of the price control concepts in the industrial
mobilization plans of the 1930s were used in the era of the Second World
War. 105 The 1933 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured an even greater
determination to see price controls implemented in time of war. That
plan included a "separate price control appendix describing the history,
objectives and methods of price control, together with recommended
legislation and a wartime price control organization. " 106
Of all the IMPs, the 1930 version was the friendliest to labor and
received by far the most labor support. 107 As we have seen, Baruch was
associated with the coercive labor policies the Woodrow Wilson administration had approved reluctantly in the Great War. The idea of conscripting labor in the event of a major war was so politically volatile that
Congress had barred the War Policies Commission from considering it. 108
Eisenhower's 1930 Army plan specifically rejected conscription of labor,
101. Moseley to Baruch, 22 May 1931; Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning
For Procurement and Industrial Mobilization," 176-S8.
102. Eisenhower, "War Policies," 196, 197.
103. Statement of General Douglas MacArthur to the War Policies Commission,
1931; Statement of Bernard Baruch to the War Policies Commission, 6 March 1931;
Rosenbloom, Peace Through Strength, 188-92.
104. Schwarz, The Speculator, 338.
105. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization, 95.
106. Ibid., 94.
107. Blum, "Birth and Death of theM-Day Plan," 68, 69; Thatcher, Planning for
Industrial Mobilization, 92.
108. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 160.
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arguing that it would be enormously divisive at precisely the moment the
nation needed unity. Instead, with some input from labor organizations
like the American Federation of Labor, it posited a "Labor Administration" that would seek to ensure that labor was fully employed and fairly
treated. 109
Another important element of the Army plan, one that has received
little attention, was the intent to create an office of public information.110
Eisenhower may not have originally suggested this idea, but he fully supported it. He believed that maintenance of civilian morale was fundamental to achieving victory in war, and that providing information that
served that purpose should be a key component of any plan. Ill
If the nation were to be ready for a modern war, ready to convert its
economy quickly and efficiently to war production, it would need a
group of experts devoted to creating and revising the plans for that eventuality. The Army IMP envisioned the enlargement of the staff of officers
who were trained in that work and assigned to it on a relatively permanent basis. Eisenhower's working title for this group of officers, who
would be led by a civilian, was the "War Department Economic Staff." 112
Eisenhower was distraught to discover how much Army-Navy squabbling existed in the 1920s and '30s, especially in regard to procurement
of supplies. He made great efforts to persuade those concerned with the
nation's security that teamwork and cooperation among the various services, institutions, and offices were essential if adequate defensive capability was to be achieved.m Trite though it may be, Eisenhower originally
drew this lesson from his athletic days and saw it reinforced as he gained
experience in the Army. In the Second World War he preached and exhibited the highest form of teamwork, and often used a football team as an
example. Though the Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) had been
created in 1922 to coordinate munitions procurement, it had accomplished little. The board had insufficient power, and disagreements
between the Army and Navy made it largely ineffective. Matters were get-

109. Eisenhower, "Brief History of Planning For Procurement and Industrial
Mobilization," 187; New York Times, 14 May 1931; Statement of General Douglas
MacArthur to the War Policies Commission, 1931; Kreidberg and Henry, History of
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166.
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ting worse, not better; the winter of 1930 saw the nadir of Army-Navy
relations in regard to procurement.114
Eisenhower decided to do something about the problem. In the article entitled "Peacetime Difficulties of Procurement Planning" he wrote
for Moseley in January of that year, he asserted:
One of the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon an organization,
is the lack of close cooperation and coordination (or rather lack of
mutual understanding) between the Army and the Navy. It is useless
to assert the fault lies wholly with either side .. . above all, lack of

appreciation in the highest positions of the great importance and
deadly seriousness of the problem involved, have prevented that
meeting of minds between the personnel of these two departments
which is a prerequisite to a successful solution. 115

Eisenhower's article helped set in motion a chain of events that led to the
reorganization and revitalization of the Army and Navy Munitions
Board. 116 Moseley used it to launch a cooperation campaign. That summer
the Navy began giving the Army "lists of facilities that the Navy considered
essential for some of its production" and established "joint machinery for
coordinating the industrial plans of the two services." 117 In 1931 Payne
wrote in his annual report that he was "particularly gratified to report that
the procurement activities of the War and Navy Departments are being
constantly brought into close co-ordination." 118 Eisenhower wanted to
make the ANMB one of the key agencies in the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan. 119 Moseley refused, citing time constraints and his own uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the still pending reforms. 120 However, when
the IMP was revised in May 1931, a reference to the ANMB was included.
Eventually the reorganized ANMB became "the sponsor of the plan for
industrial mobilization and successfully coordinated the ideas of the two
departments [War and Navy] in developing these plans." 121
114. Colonel John P. Hasson Memorandum for Colonel Irving J. Carr, March 5,
1931, File 72 (March-April), 1931, Assistant Secretary of War, Planning Branch
Records, RG 107, NARA; Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 499,
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116. War Department, Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1931, 25;
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117. Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, 500; Smith, The
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120. Hasson to Carr, 5 March 1931.
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In November 1930 the Planning Branch officers given the job of writing the IMP failed. Three years earlier, when officers assigned to the Battle Monuments Commission could not create an acceptable guidebook to
the American battlefields and cemeteries of the Great War, the project
was given to Eisenhower, who produced a much-appreciated document.
Now Moseley asked Eisenhower to write the IMP. In spite of the fact that
Eisenhower did not enjoy working on the industrialization plan, which
he called a "long irksome job," he completed the plan in a week of hard
writing. 122 His greatest challenge, he later recalled, came in the "selection and arrangement of material." 123
Eisenhower's work was impressive. Upon perusing the 1930 plan,

Lieutenant Colonel McCain, who had worked on the 1928 plan, wrote,
"they have made great strides back there [the Planning Branch] since
our day. Among other things they have finished up a very comprehensive Industrial Mobilization Plan covering the entire field . . . it represents an exhaustive piece of work. " 124
Eisenhower himself acknowledged the impact of his Industrial Mobilization Plan work on his life.
In these positions [working for the Assistant Secretary of War] I had
been forced to examine world-wide military matters and to study
concretely such subjects as the mobilization and composition of
armies, the role of air forces and navies in war, tendencies toward
mechanization, and the acute dependence of all elements of military
life upon the industrial capacity of the nation. This last was to me
of especial importance because of my intense belief that large-scale
motorization and mechanization and the development of air forces
in unprecedented strength would characterize successful military
forces of the future .. . . The years de<Voted to work of this kind
opened up to me an almost new world. During that time I met and
worked with many people whose opinions I respected highly, in both
military and civil life. [Emphasis added)1 25

Eisenhower's 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan featured the creation
of a civilian-led planning agency that would come into being at the beginning of an emergency. This superagency would coordinate the industrial
production of the nation and advise the President regarding that production. In the meantime, an expanded staff of Army officers would work
with businessmen to plan the production of war materials. Second, busi122. Susan Eisenhower, Mrs. Ike: Memories and Reflections on the Life of
Mamie Eisenhower (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), 109.
123. Chief of Staff Diary, 12 November 1930-11 December 1930, in Holt and
Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 145.
124. Thatcher, Planning for Industrial Mobilization, 93, 94.
125. Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948), 19.
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ness profits would be capped at 6 percent, cost-plus contracts would not
be used, and the Army would move toward price controls to check inflation. Third, there would be no conscription of labor; a labor administration would coordinate the needs of industry and labor. Finally, an office
of public information would educate the public to keep morale high and
the nation unified.
At the end of 1930, General Moseley left his job as Payne's assistant
to become MacArthur's Deputy Chief of Staff. On 23 November Moseley
invited Eisenhower to his home for a conversation. The general apologetically informed his aide of his impending departure. Eisenhower had
been told much earlier that he would leave whenever his chief departed,
but Payne understandably could not part with both of them at the same
time. Then Moseley told Eisenhower that the Assistant Secretary had
been so impressed with his work that he wanted Eisenhower to take over
Moseley's job. Unfortunately, he also said he had informed Payne that
Eisenhower's rank precluded that appointment; the job demanded at
least a full colonel. As consolation, Moseley told Eisenhower that Payne's
request would be placed in his service record. 126
Payne was not satisfied with that gesture. In a speech a few weeks
later at the Army War College, Payne, for a moment, left the remarks that
Eisenhower had prepared for him and inserted a call for reform of the
promotion system to allow for rewarding merit and ability. Reform of the
system, he knew, was one of MacArthur's priorities. The Army Chief of
Staff was working with the Hoover administration to pass legislation that
would allow the Army to consider merit above seniority in the promotion
to colonel as it already was for general officers. But no changes were
forthcoming during the Hoover administration. On his own initiative
MacArthur had de-emphasized seniority to some extent at that level. But
apparently Eisenhower was still too junior to meet that lower standard. 127
Unfortunately for the Army planners, the proposed creation of civilian-led agencies that were outside the framework of normal governmental machinery became a fatal flaw in the plan after the election of
1932. 128 The Army's industrial mobilization plan, as originally envisioned, was to be revised and updated every few years. This was done.
Details were changed in 1933 and 1936 but the basic plan still envisaged
that superagencies to control war industrialization would come into exis-

126. Chief of Staff Diary, 24 November 1930, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 145.
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tence once an emergency was declared. 129 As General Moseley observed,
the superagencies were the "most important part" of the plan. But with
the ascension of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1933, peacetime governmental machinery took the form of the New Deal. The politicians and bureaucrats who ran the New Deal were suspicious of any
rivals to their power, especially rivals who would come from the military
or the business community as the IMP envisioned. Making matters
worse, the Army did a poor job of explaining to the public and to government officials the rationale behind its plans. 130 In revising the plans
through the mid-1930s, it also moved away from cooperation with labor
just as labor was becoming more important politically. 131
Though Army leaders could not be certain that the President would
adopt the IMP, grassroots work continued. After the Army surveyed over
20,000 U.S. factories to discover their capacities and expertise in creating war supplies, 10,000 plants were selected for war manufacture. Moreover, there was significant, if not perfect, cooperation between the
military and business leaders. The suggestions made by industrialists
regarding design of munitions and standardization of components were
often accepted. 132
In 193 7 new Assistant Secretary of War Louis A. Johnson was determined to stimulate industrial mobilization planning. Signs of trouble in
Europe and in Asia provided impetus to Johnson's efforts, and Bernard
Baruch continued to advocate greater preparedness.133 Johnson proceeded
along the lines of the Army's original IMPs: superagencies that arose at the
time of the crisis would coordinate war production. Unfortunately for
Johnson and the nation-at least in terms of military efficiency-President Roosevelt had no intention of relinquishing control of war industrialization to agencies outside his own direct supervision. 134 True, the
superagencies were to answer to the President, but FDR was convinced
that his own authority would be compromised under the Army plan. 135
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The 1939 revision of the IMP, influenced by Baruch, was ostensibly
designed to meld efficiently with New Deal agencies. But, as Albert Blum
has shown, the President was afraid that the Army plan, by empowering
business leaders and the military, would effectively end the New Deal
and result in the loss of many of its accomplishments. 136 In an incredible
case of miscommunication between the President and Johnson, or outright bullheadedness on Johnson's part, his plan featured a new War
Resources Administration (WRA) that would oversee most of the other
war agencies contemplated in earlier plans. Johnson's plan gave great
powers to the leader of this agency who, though still theoretically under
the President's authority, would of necessity operate with a great deal of
autonomy. 137 There was no chance that such a plan would be acceptable
to FDR. 138 At one point he remarked to an adviser regarding the WRA,
"these 'fellows' wanted him to 'abdicate.' " 139 The President decided to
ignore the administrative aspects of the Army plan and in action reminiscent of the New Deal, create his own agencies, all answerable to
him. 140 Roosevelt's agencies would necessarily be created from scratch,
and thus they entered the fray late; worse, their responsibilities were
poorly defined and often overlapped. 141
As defense appropriations rose in the years before American entry
into the Second World War, the Army and Navy continued to place their
own contracts with suppliers, competing for precious commodities and
bidding up prices. If the IMP of 1930 had been followed, this foolishness
would not have occurred. The failure to institute centralized planning
from 1939 into 1943 resulted in enormous logjams of goods and serious
delays in production. 142 David Kennedy has described it:
Straining to meet the ambitious goals the president had set, procurement officers loosed their imaginations, abandoned any vestige
of managerial discipline, and lost all sight of the larger context within
which they were operating. Military purchase orders became hunt-
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ing licenses, unleashing a jostling frenzy of competition for materials
and labor in the jungle of the marketplace.

Kennedy continued:
Makers of cargo vessels gobbled up steel supplies, snarling the construction of warships. Naval purchasing agents robbed aircraft
assembly plants of aluminum. Locomotive foundries converted to
tank production when locomotives were far more urgently needed.
When construction was not stalled outright, it could end up uselessly
squandered... . At the same time, troops in training were throwing
rocks in the grenade course and using firecrackers to simulate the
scarce live ammunition that had to be carefully husbanded for the
battlefield. 143

The United States eventually became the great "Arsenal of Democracy" but only because of two fortuitous factors: time and distance. If the
continental United States had not been thousands of miles from the
major battlefields, the nation would not have had the time to properly
organize for war. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December
1941, it took Roosevelt over a year of war to finally coordinate industrial
mobilization planning under one man who could give it most of his attention. In 1943, Roosevelt confidant and former Supreme Court Justice
James F. Byrnes became head of the Office of War Mobilization. Byrnes's
office was in the White House. 144
The President's war mobilization program fell far short of the 1930
IMP in other ways as well. Indeed, there is a tremendous sense of irony
in comparing the Army IMP of 1930 to what actually occurred in the war.
The Army plan, created by conservative men such as Payne, MacArthur,
and Eisenhower, envisioned a far more centralized, controlled, and profitless war than the great architect of the New Deal produced. Though no
plan could have solved all of the difficulties the United States incurred in
converting to war production, it seems reasonable to observe that the
Army plan in virtually any of its manifestations of the 1930s would have
coordinated war production more effectively than FOR's haphazard program. Industrial mobilization planning was not a great president's finest
hour. Cost-plus contracts, inherently inflationary and wasteful-and forbidden in the 1930 plan-were used extensively during the war. The
margin of allowable profit was 10 percent, almost double the profit left to
manufacturers in the Army plan of 1930. 145
Because the Army's IMP, in terms of its organizational scheme, was
not adopted by Roosevelt in the years just before United States entry
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into World War II, historians and biographers have often dismissed
Eisenhower's work on the plan as unimportant or have given this period
of his life scant attention. 146 While it is true that Roosevelt did not adopt
the administrative machinery that the Army recommended, the grassroots work that Army officers did in the 1930s as they talked with business leaders, created relationships with them, explained needs and
concerns, and wrote and revised conversion and production plans, made
the path to effective war industrialization smoother than it would have
been otherwise.147 Concerning the value of the IMP, Burnham Finney,
editor of American Machinist and author of Arsenal of Democracy, judiciously wrote in 1941:
Are we farther along today, now that we are in an emergency, than if
we hadn't had the industrial mobilization scheme in operation for
many years? The unqualified answer is yes, "yes, we are farther
along." Proof? The army and navy knew what they wanted when the
present emergency began. That, in the opinion of expert military
men, is the outstanding difference between 1917 and today. The
thousands of plants surveyed are now starting to make the products
allocated to them under the plan. From the list of 20,000 plants [in
the plan) have come many of the 30,000 manufacturers with direct
defense contracts. Precious time has been saved; perhaps not
enough of it, but some .... Altogether, the efforts quietly exerted by
the army and navy during the years when war seemed remote have
paid dividends.148

In 1940, Assistant Secretary of War Johnson wrote in his annual report,
"Without the benefit of plans perfected by twenty years of study the successful and timely execution of this program [industrial mobilization for
war] would have been virtually impossible." [Emphasis added)1 49
Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, in his annual report for
1941, also noted that the IMP had helped the nation prepare for war:
While the industrial mobilization plan, 1939 revision, was not put
into full operation, it was followed very closely in the war department procurement activities. From August until the organization of
the Priorities Super-Agency in the latter part of December 1940 the
Army and Navy Munitions Board exercised the wartime priority
146. See Brendon, Ike, 58; Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Anny,
President-Elect, 88, 92; Davis, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 229; Perret, Eisenhower,
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function (on a purely voluntary basis by industry, but nevertheless
effectively)-in our Industrial Mobilization Plan, careful attention
had been devoted to this as well as to other wartime super-agency
functions . 150
The same year, in testimony before the Truman Committee, the Senate
committee charged with investigating war mobilization, Patterson
remarked:
When the burden of the present defense program was placed on the
Department, the supply services immediately started operating
under the Industrial Mobilization Plan. They promptly placed orders
for munitions with plants previously allocated, using informal competition wherever possible. In this way, the Ordnance Department
has placed 85 percent of its orders for small arms, artillery, and
ammunition components with industrial concerns already familiar
with the problems.151
The students at the Army Industrial College concurred with the above
comment:
A consideration of the IMP, together with its development and the
present situation, indicates that the IMP has been of great service in
the present program of industrial mobilization. While the agencies
are not strictly in accordance with those planned, the principles of
the IMP appear to be in the process of being executed. 152
Just after Dwight Eisenhower completed his work on the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan, Douglas MacArthur testified before the War Policies Commission that progress had been made relative to 1917:
Today we have a skeletonized framework of a citizen Army capable
of absorbing rapidly the military man power of the Nation (sic],
whereas in 1917 we had to build up practically a complete organization. Similarly, on the material side we are in intimate touch with the
industrial structure under a plan which will enable American industry to promptly absorb our war requirements. 153
Moreover, according to the Army's World War II economic mobilization historian, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, which Eisenhower
had helped energize in the early thirties, and which since that time had
been largely guided by Army officers from the Planning Branch,
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made substantial contributions to the rearmament program. It
launched and directed the original priorities system for World War II,
apportioned basic industrial capacity between the Army and Navy,
cleared foreign contracts for munitions production in the United
States, had an important role in breaking the machine tools bottleneck, compiled military requirements for numerous raw materials,
and performed a wide array of other services. 154

Finally, in regard to the efficacy of the IMP program and thus the significance of Eisenhower's work on it, the same historian has observed:
The creation of the War Production Board shortly after Pearl Harbor
did reflect, in many respects, the conception of the War Resources
Administration [the last form of the controlling superagency] set
forth in the Industrial Mobilization Plan. Most of the plan's other features, both organizational and functional, were utilized in the course
of the emergency, as well as after Pearl Harbor, but without specific
attribution to or necessarily resulting from the Industrial Mobilization Plan itself. 155

Dwight Eisenhower largely wrote the Army's first detailed IMP. In this
effort he was an important player in stimulating and focusing the War
Department's 1930-31 effort to create a comprehensive industrial mobilization plan.
In understanding this era and Eisenhower's place in it, it is imperative to remember also the larger political picture both in the Army and
in the nation. The Army, particularly its planning for future wars, was
unpopular in the country at large. The Army itself was divided over how
that planning should proceed and how the economy should be organized
in case of war. Hurley, Baruch, Payne, MacArthur, Moseley, and Eisenhower moved the nation to tolerate the idea of Army industrial planning
for war, and moved the Army to accept a civilian-led centralized planning agency as the cornerstone of its industrialization plan. Army industrialization planning proceeded throughout the 1930s, and a civilian-led
administrative agency was the cornerstone of that plan throughout the
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decade. Roosevelt's war production program benefited from the lowerechelon work the Army had done in the years before the war, and
eventually came back to the idea of a controlling superagency to govern
war production. 156
Eisenhower's work in these years also benefited him personally. He
became acquainted with many of the nation's important business and
political leaders, and a friend to a few. The influential Baruch, a Democrat, would support him for President in 1952. 157 Eisenhower learned how
the federal government in Washington, D.C., worked and who worked
it. 158 By the end of his service in the Assistant Secretary of War's office,
he knew as much or more about planning for industrial mobilization as
any officer in the Army.
Indeed, in the mid-1960s, Eisenhower remembered just how significant his work in this era had been for him. He wrote in At Ease:
I now undertook work that was intriguing, and frustrating, but that
ga"Ve me an early look at the military-industrial complex of whose
pressures I would later warn. Except at that point, the pressures
were exactly reversed. [Emphasis added)1 59

During his presidency (1953-61), Eisenhower endeavored to create a
defense establishment that was capable of defending the United States
indefinitely, but which did not bankrupt the nation or fundamentally
change its nature. For Eisenhower, both the old habit of dismantling the
country's defensive capability after war, and the new threat of a defense
establishment that fed on the fears of the nation and sucked away both
freedom and prosperity, had to be avoided.' 60 At the end of his administration in January 1961 he warned the American people:
In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 161

Finally, Eisenhower's work in the early 1930s impressed MacArthur,
who particularly appreciated Eisenhower's talent in writing. In 1931 the
Chief of Staff asked Eisenhower, who at that time was still assigned to
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Payne's office, to write his annual report. MacArthur wrote of the major's
work:
I desire to place on official record this special commendation for
excellent work of a highly important nature which you have just
completed under my personal direction. You not only accepted this
assignment willingly-an assignment which involved much hard
work-performing it in addition to your regular duties in the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of War, but you gave me a most acceptable
solution within a minimum of time. 162

Mamie had the letter framed "to preserve it. " 163 As Geoffrey Perret, an
authority on both Eisenhower and MacArthur, has written, "such fulsome praise from a Chief of Staff was almost unheard of." 164
MacArthur was also impressed with Eisenhower's ability to develop
relationships with business leaders, a rare talent in the Army of that
day. 165 As things turned out, Eisenhower's relationship with the majestic,
mercurial, and maddening MacArthur was just beginning.

162. Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers,
202n.l.
163. Dwight Eisenhower to Elivera Doud, 12 November 1931, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers, 201.
164. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur
(New York: Random House, 1996), 149.
165. Brandon, Mamie Doud Eisenhower, 171; Thatcher, Planning for Industrial
Mobilization, 34, 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

